


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AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE

AIR UNIVERSITY

US TRAINING FOR LATIN AMERICAN MILITARIES:  
AVOIDING AN INTERNAL SECURITY ROLE CREEP



A Research Report Submitted to the Faculty

In Partial Fulfillment of the Graduation Requirements

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## **ABSTRACT**

Why does the United States train and fund Latin American militaries in internal security roles when the US military itself trains mainly for an external defense role? The United States should train Latin American militaries in external defense roles in order to strengthen democratic civil-military relations because training in internal security roles increases the risk of military involvement in domestic politics, something which has been problematic in Latin American countries. This paper presents case studies on Argentina, El Salvador, Paraguay, and Honduras to illustrate how militaries are used to face threats in those countries. Internal and external roles for the military are defined in order to examine appropriate roles for the military. US training for the countries covered in the case studies is reviewed to examine if civilian and military students are participating in training appropriate to their roles. This paper concludes that the United States should work with Latin American countries to transition the military away from internal security roles and back into an external defense role in order to strengthen democratic civil-military relations.

## **Introduction**

The 21<sup>st</sup> century has brought new challenges to national security for the United States and for Latin America. Gangs have brought murder rates to new highs and the drug trade is flourishing. Terrorist groups that threatened countries in the past are returning to threaten stability once again and new groups are forming in other areas. Countries in Latin America are looking for solutions to these threats and are facing the temptation to use their militaries to combat them. The United States is also trying to find solutions to this threat because the drug trade flows into this country, the same gangs are causing violence within US borders, and the terrorist groups threaten regional stability.

Latin American countries often look to the United States for assistance with the threats they are facing. In the past, US assistance strengthened militaries at the expense of weak democratic institutions and there was no emphasis on respect for human rights. Today, the United States offers training and equipment for militaries and for civilian agencies with a focus on respect for human rights and civil-military relations. The easy solution to some of the transnational threats is to train and equip the military since it usually has a sufficient manpower level to deal with these threats. But is this the right course of action? This paper argues that the easy solution is not necessarily the correct one.

This issue of dealing with these threats is also entangled with the proper role for militaries—external or internal. In a region where few external threats to countries remain, militaries are struggling to find new missions to justify their existence. The chances of Latin American countries going to war with each other today are very low. “It has been over 70 years since the region has seen an interstate war last more than a month.”<sup>1</sup> Added to this mix are the current budget cuts that the US military is experiencing which means that foreign assistance cannot be funded as abundantly and broadly as it used to be. The US military should concentrate

its assistance in the areas where it can make the most impact while addressing its own national security needs. It should also do this with an eye to the history of a region that experienced military dictatorships and where memories of brutal repression by Latin American militaries and police forces remain.

### **The Research Question**

Why does the United States train and fund Latin American militaries in internal security roles when the US military itself trains mainly for an external defense role? The United States should train Latin American militaries in external defense roles in order to strengthen democratic civil-military relations because training in internal security roles increases the risk of military involvement in domestic politics, something which has been problematic in Latin American countries.

### **Research Methodology**

A problem-solution approach will be used in addition to case studies as methodologies for this research. First, this paper uses case studies of El Salvador, Honduras, Paraguay, and Argentina to examine the military roles in those countries and the state of civil-military relations. Using the case studies will provide examples of how internal or external roles can affect civil military relations. It is difficult to generalize because each country has its unique situation with civilian and military leadership and threats that they face; however, it is useful to examine them comparatively because they provide examples of different military roles in these countries and current civil military relations there.

Next, examples of training that the United States is providing to Latin American militaries are examined with an emphasis on training in the countries outlined in the case studies. For these examples, interviews were conducted with personnel from the countries in the case

studies. Interviews were also conducted with personnel working in, or who have worked in, the State Partnership Program under the National Guard Bureau and United States Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) in the Security Cooperation Offices.

Using the problem solution methodology this paper examines the way the United States currently trains Latin American militaries and considers which roles that training is geared towards. An examination of the training conducted in the case study countries provides examples of how certain types of training are linked to the current roles of the militaries and state of civil-military relations in each particular country. This provides implications for future training and development plans. Possible solutions are considered such as using the State Partnership Program or Department of Defense funding for the Department of Justice and Department of State to train police forces and other applicable civilian agencies instead of the military forces in each country.

## **Background**

### **Problem Background and Significance**

Militaries traditionally exist to execute an external defense role. External defense roles can take the traditional form of defending against a threat from another state; however, roles can also include peacekeeping, participation in a multinational force abroad, or regional disaster relief units. As stated above, the external threats in Latin America are diminishing and while some countries have adopted peacekeeping as a new external role, other countries are increasingly using their militaries in an internal role.

When militaries have internal security as a primary role, rather than an external defense role, there is more of a tendency for them to get involved in domestic politics. They may see themselves as the only government entity capable of providing for the needs of the citizens and

perceive the need to step into politics. When the military perceives the need to step in, it results in “mission creep” as they perform internal security duties. “Mission creep,” refers to “the armed forces gradually taking over duties that by law or convention should be performed by civilians. That expansion generally takes place when military leadership...believes that no other governmental agency, group or organization is capable of undertaking the task.”<sup>2</sup> This puts civil military relations and democracy at risk. Even when the internal role seems innocent and well-intentioned, such as civic action, it can undermine existing civilian agencies charged with that task. Another danger is that when these smaller militaries become focused on an internal role, the skills needed to execute an external defense role can atrophy. This is due to the sizes of most Latin American militaries which are not large enough to accomplish both roles.

The citizens of Latin American countries have experienced harsh military dictatorships and democracies are still struggling to mature. Memories of brutal treatment, at the hands of an internally-focused military, are still fresh in the minds of many. In addition, civilian agencies, such as Ministries of Health and disaster response agencies, have not reached their full potential in many countries. Relying on the military for civic action, development activities, and police roles risks keeping civilian agencies from developing to meet their responsibilities.

With the threat of drugs and criminal activities crossing borders and spreading a wave of violence, the temptation to use the military to control this threat is high as police forces are mostly seen as corrupt and incapable of handling internal security problems. The United States is also concerned about these issues because they affect national security and due to this, the US government is willing to provide funding for equipment and training. Unfortunately, equipment and training is also, in and of itself, an incentive for Latin American militaries to want to step in and get a “piece of the pie.”



While there are other factors involved in the development of healthy US civil-military relations, a focus on an external defense role and professionalization of the military have helped prevent politicization of the US military. There are clearly defined boundaries for the police and for the military as dictated by Posse Comitatus. Since the US military is a model for many countries, it seems wise to train Latin American militaries to focus on an external defense role.

Of course, the United States has a much larger military and government bureaucracy than those that exist in Latin American countries. The purpose of this paper is not to compare the United States with smaller Latin American countries and militaries. In fact, there are other models within Latin America that may be more appropriate. Rather, this research examines ways that the United States can use its established history of democracy and civil-military relations to better assist those countries with achieving healthier civil-military relations while building partnerships that can also contribute to our national security.

One promising avenue that will be examined in this paper is the State Partnership Program (SPP) which enables smaller countries to relate on a more level playing field by working with the US National Guard, state governments, and agencies. Through the SPP and cooperation with other US agencies, training can be tailored to help further positive civil-military relations in Latin America. Incorporating additional Latin American countries to assist will also be important since, as stated above, other models may be more appropriate. In addition, with the budget cuts that the United States is facing, regional cooperation with other partners such as Brazil, Argentina, and Chile may provide some cost saving measures.

## **Overview of Threats**

The threats from drug trafficking, human trafficking, terrorists, gangs and other criminal organizations impact more than the security of the individual countries in Latin America. They

also impact regional security and the national security of the United States. This was noted by General Douglas Fraser, Commander of Southern Command, in his Posture Statement before Congress:

The emergence of a collective of compromised states in Central America that is unable to counter transnational threats would have enormous implications for the United States and the hemisphere. The inability of one country to effectively respond to the intertwined threats of transnational organized crime and illicit trafficking is troubling; the inability of an entire subregion has serious implications for regional stability and the security of the United States.<sup>3</sup>

Due to this national security impact, the United States has been involved in assisting partner nations with these issues.

The threat from gangs has been rising steadily, particularly in Central America. The Mexican drug cartels have been increasing their influence in the area as they transit cocaine through Central America. The Mexican drug cartels and Central American gangs help transit drugs to the United States and, according to a Congressional Research Service Report, “Currently, as much as 90% of all illicit drugs that enter North America from South America have transited Central America.”<sup>4</sup> The Mexican drug cartels are a major area of interest to the United States as they have brought violence across US borders. The United States has been working closely with Mexico through the Merida Initiative to help combat this threat. “The Central America portion of Merida was split into a separate Central America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI) in FY2010...As currently formulated, CARSI provides equipment, training, and technical assistance to build the capacity of Central American institutions to counter criminal threats.”<sup>5</sup>

One of those criminal threats is *Mara Salvatrucha*, or MS-13, which is a gang that has exploded in its numbers of members and murders committed in the United States and throughout Central America. This gang was formed in the 1980s in Los Angeles, California by Salvadorans

in an attempt to fight back against gangs of other ethnicities. Their members soon included people from other Central American countries. When Maras were arrested and jailed for their crimes, many of them were deported back to their countries. Once they returned to their countries, they were able to recruit members for their gang there and continue their activities. The members coming back from the United States were admired by young people in the Central American ghettos because of the image they had of US gang members. These original members had flashy clothes and money and the young people who admired them wanted this, too.

The membership numbers of these gangs are very high in Central America considering their relatively small populations. According to a Congressional Research Service Report, “Estimates of Central American gang membership by country also vary considerably, but the U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) has cited country membership totals of some 36,000 in Honduras, 14,000 in Guatemala, and 10,500 in El Salvador.”<sup>6</sup> The Maras have become a threat not only in Central America but also in the United States. They have expanded beyond Los Angeles to other major US cities and have committed brutal murders along with threatening police and federal agents in the United States. They are involved in the drug trade as well as human trafficking. MS-13 is partnered with the Mexican Mafia and this deadly partnership has led to murder rates spiraling out of control.

The Maras are a major threat in El Salvador and, while they also operate in Honduras, the Mexican cartels have been leading the murders in Honduras. According to one article in 2011, “On a per capita basis, the small nation of Honduras far out paced every other country in the world in homicides with 82 murders per 100,000 people last year according to the United Nations.”<sup>7</sup> The citizens in Central America are crying out to their governments to act and find a solution to the violence. The governments have responded by calling the military in to conduct

operations against these gangs. One of the reasons for this is that these gangs are becoming more organized and have started to adopt military tactics. As one scholar noted, “Narcotics organizations field paramilitary units with weapons of war that...equalize and sometimes trump the firepower of the legal forces.”<sup>8</sup>

While the main threats in Central America include gangs and drugs, countries in South America face threats that also include groups with Communist ideologies that are willing to use violence to force a change in government. In Paraguay, for example, the *Ejército del Pueblo Paraguayo* (Paraguayan People’s Army, EPP) “is a group comprised of criminal elements accused of murdering police officials and attacking police and military outposts.”<sup>9</sup> They also have ties with the *Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia* (Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces, FARC). The EPP have claimed to have a Marxist-Leninist ideology although other leftists have condemned their acts of violence. According to one scholar, “The EPP has declared that it wants to establish a ‘Socialist/Communist’ republic of Paraguay, and it will resort to violence to achieve this, but it is unclear what this utopian government would look like, particularly regarding its leadership.”<sup>10</sup>

The EPP has increased its operations in recent years with attacks against the police and military as well as exploding bombs across the country. Two of their more famous kidnapping cases were of Paraguayan President Cubas’ daughter, who they later murdered, and Fidel Zavala, a prosperous rancher who was held for over three months before being released. The author was working in Paraguay when Zavala was kidnapped and observed that many members of the upper class, especially ranchers, were very concerned that they could be kidnapped as well and they did not have much hope that the government would be able to provide security against this possibility. In fact, Zavala’s family did not want to work with the government because they

feared that the government's efforts would get him killed. Instead, they turned to Colombian advisors and eventually paid the ransom. After his release, the EPP attempted to distribute goods and food to some of the Indian villages in Paraguay and their efforts were refused by some of these villages.

The EPP does not have much support but their increased attacks have many Paraguayans concerned for their safety. In fact, in 2010, newspapers reported that the EPP was looking at possibly kidnapping US military personnel involved in Medical Civic Action Programs (MEDCAPs) in rural areas. The situation reached the point that in 2010, President Lugo of Paraguay declared an emergency situation and had the military conduct joint operations with the police in an unsuccessful attempt to hunt down EPP members. Since then the military has continued to be called on to provide security and attempt to track and capture members of the EPP.

Additional threats in Paraguay, and Argentina and Brazil, can be found in the Tri-Border Area (TBA), primarily in the city of Ciudad del Este in Paraguay. There is a large black market run by criminal elements and Middle Eastern terrorist groups such as Hezbollah. This is also an area of concern for US national security because of the terrorist element in the area. The United States has been working with the three countries in order to combat this threat in what is known as the "Three Plus One" Group as well as by providing training through the Counter Terrorism Fellowship Program (CTFP) executed by the US DOD. Paraguay is also a major drug transshipment area and has no radar capability to spot aircraft that could be flying through its airspace with drugs and utilizing airstrips located on ranches throughout the country. There are many undergoverned areas in Paraguay and the criminal element is able to operate with impunity. Considering this short summary of the grave criminal and terrorist threats within

Central and South America, it is not difficult to see why the countries involved might turn to their militaries for support. The case studies that follow, illustrate some of the ways that militaries are being used against these threats in Central and South America.

## **Case Studies**

### **Overview of the Case Studies**

Military roles, security issues, and civil-military relations will be examined for Argentina, Honduras, El Salvador, and Paraguay.<sup>11</sup> The case studies of these countries will be compared and contrasted to provide diverse insight into external and internal roles for the military and their impact on civil-military relations. Some background information on military rule in these countries also examines how history may affect the use of the military in an internal role. These countries were selected to provide a continuum of a possible alternative model for security forces, worst-case scenario, and countries that fall somewhere between the two on the spectrum of civil-military relations, threats, and military roles.

Argentina is an example of a country where the military is focused on an external role and there are healthy civil-military relations. The external role is not the traditional defense role but one of peacekeeping which provides a mission for the military where there are no perceived threats from neighbors. Thus, Argentina can provide some alternative models for police forces, military roles, and civil-military relations for other countries in the region. They could assist in providing training for police in conjunction with US efforts. Honduras is an example at the other end of the spectrum where the military is involved in many domestic areas and is focused primarily on an internal role. The coup in 2009 illustrates the decline of civil-military relations there.

In El Salvador, there is an attempt to keep the military focused on an external role but internal security threats have caused the government to call on the military for assistance. Civil-military relations at the moment seem healthy enough but this could become strained as the military is called to take on an internal role. Paraguay's military is in a similar situation although with slightly different threats in the country than El Salvador. Civil-military relations have been tense since the election of President Lugo and it remains to be seen in which direction they could go.

## **Argentina**

The "Dirty War" in Argentina took place from 1976 until 1983. The military junta that was in power then justified the use of death squads, torture, and killings by claiming that they were fighting a war against Communist subversives. This resulted in thousands of "*desaparecidos*," or missing persons, whose fate can only be guessed at. Military rule began with a coup in 1976 overthrowing Isabel Peron, as left-wing guerrilla attacks rose. Civilian rule, with Raul Alfonsin as the President, returned in 1983 after the Argentine military was defeated by the British in the Falklands War—known as the Malvinas War to Argentines.

Argentina's experience with the "Dirty War" left many civilians with bitter memories of the military. As civilians tightened their hold on power, it was clear that the military needed to be transformed. Argentines did not trust or respect the military and the prestige that they had during the junta rule was gone. Many military personnel had to find second jobs just to make ends meet. This was a far cry from the lifestyle they had lived before. Added to this was the belief that with so much focus on internal security, the skills needed for external defense had become weakened. An opinion voiced by Brazilians regarding the Argentine military's change in focus was, "The biggest impression Malvinas made on them was that the Argentine military,

since it had organized itself to dominate internal enemies, was completely unprepared to fight a major international power.”<sup>12</sup> Transformation for the Argentine military involved examining their roles and how to regain respect in the international community and from their fellow citizens. In addition to the loss of trust, respect, and prestige, the military was also dealing with budget and manning cuts and conscription was halted.

Today, the military in Argentina is focused on an external defense role but this encompasses more than the traditional role of defense against threats from other countries. Their external defense role also has peacekeeping as a large component. According to one scholar, “Only under very exceptional circumstances—when civilian security forces are overwhelmed—do armed forces have the authority to participate in functions that come under the rubric of ‘internal security’.”<sup>13</sup> According to one scholar, in the area of conventional defense, there is still a perceived threat from other countries, “Chile remains Argentina’s biggest rival, though diminished tensions with this country as well as with Brazil...have rendered rather remote the possibility of a conventional war.”<sup>14</sup> The military has moved away from the military junta days when the military was very involved in civic action activities and now has almost no involvement in that area. By law, the internal security role is executed by the police. The police conduct counterdrug operations since Argentina is used as a transshipment point. The military assists in counterdrug operations only in the area of logistics support.

In the 1980s, the military was slowly subordinated to civilian authority but there was hostility towards changes made by civilian leadership. President Carlos Menem was aware of this hostility and looked for ways to placate the military by finding a meaningful role for them. This role would also help reestablish some of the prestige the military had lost. According to one scholar, “Sending Argentina’s armed forces on United Nations peacekeeping missions



throughout the world since 1990 is the centerpiece of this aspect of Menem's military policy."<sup>15</sup> While on peacekeeping missions, the Argentine military can practice their skills and gain extra pay while also gaining professional experience from working with militaries from other countries.<sup>16</sup> The military can also maintain a high level of training while on these missions which is especially important in light of budget cuts.<sup>17</sup>

When countries participate in peacekeeping missions and work with other countries, they are able to build relationships with personnel from the other militaries. Argentina was able to use these experiences to build trust with the countries that they worked with. When trust is built, tensions can be reduced which also benefits the Argentine military. In addition to deploying for peacekeeping operations, the Argentine military also created the *Centro Argentino de Entrenamiento Conjunto para Operaciones de Paz* (CAECOPAZ), Argentine Center for Joint Peacekeeping Operations Training. One scholar observes that "This school and Argentina's membership in SHIRBIG [United Nations' multinational Standby High Readiness Brigade] represent a commitment by the military to transformation, from an archaic territorial force to a modern, intelligent, well-trained, international force that serves the needs of democracy and advances the country's standing internationally."<sup>18</sup> The external defense role of peacekeeping keeps the Argentine military away from domestic politics while providing opportunities for professionalization, training, prestige, and a justification for existence at a time when there are no major threats from other countries.

## **El Salvador**

While the Constitutions of both Argentina and El Salvador limit the military to an external defense role except in emergency situations, El Salvador has had to use that exception because of the threats that it is facing. The military in El Salvador rose to power in 1931 in a

coup because of dissatisfaction with a lack of pay.<sup>19</sup> The military continued to have direct involvement in politics for almost 50 years until 1979. In 1979, power was returned to civilian leadership in the form of a civil-military junta. Yet even after that date, the military had strong political power because of a 12-year civil war between the government of El Salvador and the insurgent Faribundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) which ended in 1992 with the signing of the Chapultepec Accords. These accords resulted in the restructuring of the military and their roles.

El Salvador currently faces internal security threats from gang violence and drugs and this is exacerbated by a high level of poverty, although their economy has improved somewhat. Even though they have been faced with these challenges to security, the military has not intervened in domestic politics since the accords were signed in 1992. A possible reason for this is that, as part of the Accords, the insurgents were reintegrated into government positions, including the police and the military. In accordance with the peace agreements, the constitution was amended to prohibit the military from playing an internal security role except under extraordinary circumstances. The National Civilian Police (PNC) was created and staffed with 16,000 personnel in order to fulfill the internal security role and military forces were cut to 15,000 personnel.<sup>20</sup> The primary focus for El Salvador's military has been an external defense role. They have participated in peacekeeping missions and supported multinational operations in Iraq. The United States gratefully acknowledged that, "El Salvador was a committed member of the coalition of nations fighting against terrorism and sent 11 rotations of troops to Iraq to support Operation Iraqi Freedom from 2003 through 2008."<sup>21</sup>

In times of emergency, such as during natural disasters or rising gang activities, the Salvadoran military has been called in to take on an internal security role by providing disaster

relief or combatting gangs. The most pressing security threats that El Salvador has right now are coming from gang activities and drug trafficking. At one point, a “*mano dura*”—translated as strong hand or iron fist—strategy in El Salvador utilized the military but was not successful because of abuses and because gangs adapted to security measures. El Salvador turned to the United States for assistance with these threats. The United States has been providing aid to the police in El Salvador but for a short time in the 2000s, this was not the case, as “Southern Command gave some very serious consideration of military aid to fight gangs. This was mainly because the U.S. government lacked an overall counter-gang strategy at the time, and because Central American governments were regularly asking Southcom to provide military aid to fight gangs.”<sup>22</sup> Civilian agencies in the United States such as the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and DOS now lead counter-gang strategy rather than the DOD. The United States is also providing funding for counter-gang activities to the National Civilian Police instead of to the military.

The military and police in El Salvador have a good working relationship and have a fairly high level of trust in each other; however, according to a Salvadoran military officer, the police still do not have enough training, manpower, or discipline to deal with the security issues they are facing and police equipment has not been properly maintained.<sup>23</sup> The officer stated that this stems from the fact that many of the original National Civilian Police were guerrillas that were reintegrated into society and the government, according to the terms of the Peace Accords, and that they brought with them their style of dress, lack of discipline, and attitude against government organizations and authority.<sup>24</sup> The Salvadoran military would like to see the police reach the point where they are capable of providing security on their own because the military prefers the external defense role.

The Salvadoran military is no longer deploying to Iraq and Salvadoran citizens are crying out to their government to crack down on gang violence. There is more of a temptation to use the military to answer these calls even though they were not effective in the past. This potential use of the military in this kind of internal role could reverse the better civil-military relations that have improved since the Peace Accords. The trend towards an internal security role is actually a dangerous one because of the history of military involvement in politics that is still very recent. According to one Salvadoran military officer, there have been good comments from civilians regarding the presence of the military on the streets, on the borders, and around the jails because they have seen an increase in security. Although this is positive on the surface, it could lead to some overconfidence in the military about the security that they are able to provide. Fortunately, the military does not seem to desire completely taking over the internal security role as the military seems to prefer in Honduras.

Some options are to increase participation in peacekeeping operations or to contribute to a regional disaster relief unit. Central America could benefit from a unit like this in order to receive assistance quickly from military personnel who are familiar with the region in the event of natural disasters. Options for dealing with gang violence could include US agencies focusing on developing specialized units in the police that have heavier weapons and military-style units and tactics to deal with more militarized gangs.

## **Paraguay**

Paraguay has been facing slightly different threats than those found in Central America, although it is also a drug transshipment area, and like El Salvador has chosen to use its military in an internal role due to a perceived emergency situation. In the 1930s and 1940s, Paraguay experienced a series of dictatorships, a civil war, and the Chaco War. The Chaco War was

fought against Bolivia in the Chaco region in the northern part of Paraguay and it brought both countries close to economic collapse. In 1954, General Alfredo Stroessner took power and remained in power for the next 35 years until he was overthrown in a coup in 1989. During Stroessner's dictatorship, brutalities and disappearances were committed primarily by the police but also by the military, which enjoyed many benefits and power during Stroessner's rule.

After civilians took power in 1993, military pay and prestige decreased although they still held political influence through the Colorado party. There was an unsuccessful coup attempt in 1996; however, the leader of the coup, General Lino Oviedo, was allowed to return from exile to campaign for the Presidency. In 2008, President Fernando Lugo, a candidate of a combination of opposition parties, was elected ending over 60 years of Colorado party rule.<sup>25</sup> From this author's observations in country at the time of the elections and the two years following them, there was a continuing fear of another military coup. President Lugo was so concerned about this that he changed the service chiefs and the Chief of Defense several times.

According to the Paraguayan Constitution, the Paraguayan military is assigned an external defense role except in times of emergency when the President can authorize them to perform public security duties jointly with the police for a period of 30 days which can be extended, if required. There is a perceived threat from Brazil, particularly when the Brazilian military conducts exercises in the Tri-Border area, where the borders of Brazil, Argentina, and Paraguay meet. There is also a perceived threat from Bolivia which remains from the Chaco War experience. Yet in conversations with Paraguayan military officers, they have told the author that they realize that there is not a realistic threat from these countries and that they receive training from the Brazilians and conduct exchanges with them.<sup>26</sup>

The DOD has been working with the Paraguayan military to form multi-role engineering companies as peacekeeping units as well as with other countries to build a Center for Joint Peacekeeping Operations Training Center (CECOPAZ). One of these units deployed to Haiti in 2010 to conduct operations as part of the UN mission there. According to one Paraguayan officer, the units are a good way for NCOs to earn extra money since the officers can deploy individually as UN military observers to gain extra money.<sup>27</sup> This is an important incentive for a poorly paid military. They also recognize the prestige and excellent training that they receive from these experiences.

As explained by one Paraguayan officer, since their budget has been cut, opportunities for training have also gone down because of the cost of fuel and spare parts and they would like to increase participation in peacekeeping operations or even participate in multinational operations.<sup>28</sup> The military is able to gain some extra funds (and flying hours) by conducting activities such as renting their aircraft and pilots for private use, such as to businessmen desiring to go to the Chaco region to explore sites for their companies. At one point, the Presidential aircraft was rented to the national soccer team to fly them to their games!

Serious internal threats remain in Paraguay. The EPP has increased attacks and kidnappings in Paraguay which led to President Lugo declaring an emergency and deploying the military to conduct joint operations with the police in 2010. Unlike the cooperation between the military and police in El Salvador, the military and police in Paraguay have a high degree of mistrust for each other. This led to an unfortunate incident in 2010 during which the military entered a police station during the hunt for EPP members and began to fire their weapons and throw police onto the ground.<sup>29</sup> The explanation by the military was that they had been given information that EPP members were in the area and possibly hiding there.

The majority of the population believes that corruption runs rampant through the police force. Civilians feel more secure when they see the military on patrols or at checkpoints according to a Paraguayan officer.<sup>30</sup> There is higher level of trust in the military than in the police. This is an ominous situation, especially given the military's tendency to interfere in government, because they have a high degree of confidence that they are the ones that are capable of bringing security to the people. Fortunately, many members of the Paraguayan military have mentioned to the author that they would prefer that the police were able to achieve a higher level of capability so that the military could concentrate on external defense roles rather than a police role.

Other areas of internal roles performed by the military include civic action activities such as disaster relief and medical events. The United States helped form a Civil Affairs Unit in the Paraguayan military which works with civilian ministries during emergency situations and works with the Ministry of Health and the DOD to execute MEDCAPs. According to a Paraguayan officer, the military has had to justify its existence to Congress and being able to perform these activities is one way for them to do this and to receive a possible budget increase.<sup>31</sup> The Paraguayan armed forces know that they need to look for new ways to receive more funding from their government as well as more training and equipment grant opportunities from the United States.<sup>32</sup>

The civic action and disaster relief activities are led by civilian agencies, such as the Ministry of Health (MOH) and the Secretariat for National Emergencies (SEN), but the majority of the support comes from the military. The DOS works with these agencies to help improve their capabilities but the personnel still do not have the organization and skills required to fulfill

their missions. The United States should continue to train these agencies and encourage appointing more capable agency heads.

Civilian agency heads are political appointees who may not have had any experience in the agency that they are leading. Even when civilian agencies are leading an effort, their role may not be recognized which can lead the public to believe that they are not involved. For example, the MEDCAPs have been publicized in Paraguayan newspapers as being led and organized by the Paraguayan military and supported by the US military even though the Ministry of Health played a large role.<sup>33</sup> Since the US Embassy Public Diplomacy office gets the facts out on anything the US Embassy is involved with, it would be a small and easy thing to do for the United States to help shape the message that is being sent towards one that lets Paraguayan citizens know that the civilian agencies in their government are playing the lead role.

## **Honduras**

Honduras is at the other end of the continuum from Argentina, El Salvador, and Paraguay. The Constitution allows the military to participate in a broad spectrum of roles internally and the military has made much use of this. Honduras had a very turbulent experience of frequent military coups from 1955 until 1986 when President Jose Azcona Hoyo was elected in the first peaceful transfer of power between civilian presidents in over 30 years.<sup>34</sup> During the 1980s, smaller leftist guerrilla groups were conducting terrorist acts and the military responded with detentions, executions, and torture with the most notorious unit conducting these acts being Battalion 3-16. Fortunately, Honduras did not experience the long civil wars that some of its neighbors did and these left-wing groups dispersed after guerrilla groups in Nicaragua were unable to continue providing aid to them.



In 2009, Honduran President Jose Manuel Zelaya was removed from power in a military coup. He had been developing closer ties with President Hugo Chavez in Venezuela and was attempting to reform the constitution. The President of Congress, Roberto Micheletti, was sworn in as the interim president and in late 2009, President Porfirio Lobo was elected.<sup>35</sup> During the time between the coup and the election, the military was pulled in to restore order during which beatings and other abuses occurred.<sup>36</sup> An astute observation in Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment noted that, "It [the military] undermined not only the political process but also its own standing in society, and underlined the danger to future civilian governments of possible military intervention."<sup>37</sup>

The Honduran military is currently involved in many areas of internal security and domestic politics. One of the reasons for this is that the Honduran Constitution provides for a broad interpretation of the role of the military:

The Honduran armed forces' multifaceted role in citizens' daily lives is supported by ambiguous and permissive language in the country's 1982 constitution: 'The armed forces are formed to defend the Republic's territorial integrity and sovereignty, to maintain the peace, public order and respect for the Constitution, the principles of free suffrage and the rotation in power of the Presidents of the Republic'.<sup>38</sup>

This allows them to participate in internal roles such as policing roles, civic action, and development. Although Honduras sent troops to Iraq in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom and they have participated as observers in UN peacekeeping missions, the primary focus is on an internal role.<sup>39</sup> There is cooperation with US troops stationed at Soto Cano Air Base but this is also in the area of internal roles with participation in disaster relief and civic action activities within Honduras. According to the US Department of State, "Until suspension as a result of the June 2009 coup, the two countries conducted joint peacekeeping, counternarcotics, humanitarian, disaster relief, and civic action exercises."<sup>40</sup> With the exception of peacekeeping, it is notable

that these activities all focus on internal roles. The United States should make use of this proximity and the relationships that have been built to train the military in more of an external role rather than helping them become more entrenched in domestic areas.

Honduras is experiencing similar threats to those that El Salvador faces but Honduras is more prone to use the military than El Salvador in response to drugs and gang violence. As is the case with many countries in Latin America, with a few exceptions, citizens and the military do not trust the police. They are considered to be corrupt and possibly involved with organized crime themselves. An example of this occurred in November 2011, when 176 Honduran officers were arrested for having links to gangs.<sup>41</sup> According to the US Department of State, the United States “strongly supports the professionalization of the civilian police force as an important element in strengthening the rule of law in Honduras.”<sup>42</sup> The United States should continue focusing on professionalizing the civilian police force and form specialized units in the police as was mentioned in the El Salvador case study. There should also be more assistance to the civilian agencies in Honduras that could take over civic action activities to strengthen the hold that civilian authorities have on power.

### **Internal Roles**

Militaries have traditionally performed in external defense roles but as illustrated in the case studies, there has been more of a transition towards using the military in an internal role. Internal roles for the military refer to the military participating in or taking the lead in roles that would normally be fulfilled by civilian agencies such as policing, civic action, and disaster relief. The area of most concern is the police role. Pollsters for *AmericasBarometer* propose that “If people are unsure that the police can and will provide security and order, public confidence in the law enforcement, criminal justice, and judicial systems and potentially in the democratic

regime more broadly will be undermined.”<sup>43</sup> Citizens and even the governments in many Latin American countries do not trust their police to counter internal security threats. Police are either seen as corrupt or as not having enough manpower, training or equipment to provide adequate security. Usually it is a combination of corruption and lack of resources that makes using the military seem like a better option.

The military are called in during emergency situations when the capabilities of the police are exceeded. While aerial and maritime interdiction are more appropriate for the military to provide support to the police, patrolling the streets and jails and making arrests are best left to the police. The easy solution has been to use the military in these other areas because they have the manpower, training, and equipment but there has not been much consideration for long-term planning. There is no defined timeline for how long the military will perform this role or for how to develop the police into a more capable force. The United States has provided training and equipment for the police but this is still a short-term fix. A US military officer in the Office of the Secretary of Defense who works in the area of counternarcotics characterized government actions as more “tactical or operational” and that the government needed a “much broader strategy.”<sup>44</sup> Many times assistance concentrates on the immediate threat of arresting a person of interest or stopping a shipment of drugs. More attention needs to be focused on how to transition this role back to the police from the military. Some recommendations for this will be outlined below.

In the area of civic action, participation by the military is seen by some as a way for the military to build trust with fellow citizens and mend fences in countries where bad memories of the military remain. This seems like a very innocent and helpful activity but according to one scholar, “Reinforcing military capabilities in nonmilitary tasks increases the likelihood that

neither civilian agencies nor the private sector will ever develop those capabilities.”<sup>45</sup> While it may be a way for some militaries to justify their existence, if it continues it should at least be led by civilian agencies.

The military is also used for disaster relief which may seem to make sense at first. It depends on how the military is integrated in these efforts that determines if this role helps more than hurts in the long run. Disaster experts have observed that “Governments have opted for a militarized approach because it brings a unified command structure and strong logistical prowess that can remove victims from harm’s way quickly. Military leaders do less well in coordinating long-term, broadly based management.”<sup>46</sup> The Colombia model was cited as a good model with all agencies, civilian and military, being integrated in the “*Sistema Nacional*” as one unit that reported to the President.<sup>47</sup> In this model there is more civilian and military cooperation rather than resentment by civilian agencies that feel that they are being ignored.

Involving the military with an internal role should be done with a defined timeline in mind and with a clearly defined support role. It should be done only with the understanding that they are subordinate to any civilian agencies and leadership in order to support healthy civil-military relations. In situations where the military is the only choice to deal with a situation it should be done with a plan to develop civilian agencies and transition tasks over to them. The United States can help by taking a broader stance in supporting this development and clearly stating a desire to support a transition to civilian agencies.

### **External Roles**

A military’s main reason for existence is usually the traditional role of defense against external threats from neighboring countries. An external role for the military also decreases the chances of them becoming involved in domestic issues by focusing them externally. In Latin

America, external threats are unlikely to manifest which has left many militaries in the region struggling to define what their role should be.

There still remain other ways for Latin American militaries to take on an external defense role such as participation in peacekeeping or multinational operations. This can help improve civil-military relations by focusing the military externally, as “Peacekeeping duties permit governments to assign legitimate external roles to military forces that might otherwise stay at home, complicating the division of labor among other public institutions and themselves.”<sup>48</sup> These types of activities also offer opportunities for training, increased respect and prestige domestically and internationally, and working with militaries from other countries. When militaries from different countries are able to work together, this can increase trust between countries and decrease tensions.

Many militaries in Latin America have experienced budget cuts which adversely affects training. When the military participates in peacekeeping or multinational operations they can maintain their skills and learn new ones from counterparts in other militaries. These operations can also lead to more professionalization as some US policymakers observed that peacekeeping operations “might even make young officers more cosmopolitan, less nationalistic, and more resistant to calls for military ‘salvation’ via coup in times of crises.”<sup>49</sup> As mentioned above, peacekeeping operations or UN military observer positions also provide some extra pay which is a major incentive for participation.

The Department of Defense (DOD) has already been assisting militaries in Latin America with organizing and equipping peacekeeping units. The United States has also rewarded countries, such as El Salvador, with extra training funds in return for their participation in multinational operations, such as in Iraq. This is a positive area for the DOD to continue

working in with Latin America because it helps these militaries find a new reason to justify their existence while returning some prestige to them. Most importantly, it helps them focus externally rather than internally where they might be tempted to interfere in political matters.

## **Training**

One can almost sense the status of civil-military relations in each country by looking at the break down of training for each country. The training provided by the United States is funded through International Military Education and Training (IMET), Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI), Counterterrorism Fellowship Program (CTFP), and 1004 (Counterdrug training). Some countries have a fairly even split of training being attended by military and civilians—unless, of course, it is a course limited strictly to military attendees. Other countries only have military attendees unless there is a Civil-Military Relations Course taught by a Mobile Education Team (MET) in country, which is then evenly split between civilians and military. In some cases one can find dual use courses which are courses that have material taught that could be used for military or police roles. If a country's military is not performing an external defense role, the question should be raised about the purpose of that training. The following information regarding the types of training that each country participated in was compiled from the Department of State (DOS) Foreign Military Training and DOD Engagement Activities of Interest Reports for the timeframe of 2007-2011.<sup>50</sup>

In Argentina, for the timeframe of 2010-2011, training attendees seem to fall in the areas that are most appropriate for their affiliation and their roles. For instance, the Combatting Terrorism Course and Container Inspection Course were attended by the police and Coast Guard. The Border Security Course was attended by the police and the Air Force, which would support the police. There were several Professional Military Education (PME) courses which helps build

the professionalization of the military as well as a Civil-Military Relations Course which was attended by an even mix of civilians and military. Most importantly, the counterdrug courses were attended primarily by police with only one being attended by military members. There did not appear to be any dual-use courses. This indicates that there is an interest in healthy civil-military relations and professionalization of the military. It also shows that the police are firmly in the role of internal security with the military providing support in appropriate areas such as aerial or maritime interdiction, which comprise the remainder of the courses.

In El Salvador, one can still see an even mix of civilians and military in counterterrorism courses and the Civil-Military Relations MET. Also conducted were a Media and the Military MET and Military's Role in Disaster Response MET which included participation by civilians as well as military students indicating a cooperation between the two. PME courses attended by the military indicate a continued desire to professionalize the military. The Counter Narcoterrorism (CNT) Information Analyst and Counterdrug Operations Courses were primarily attended by military personnel but would have benefitted the police. The remainder of the counterdrug training involved a maritime interdiction role which is appropriate for the military. There were also several courses involving infantry training which could be considered dual use courses. This shows that while there is still a desirable level of interest in maintaining a professional force and good civil-military relations, there is a slide towards training for an internal security role for the military with limited participation by the police.

In Paraguay, civilians attended only one course which was a MET conducted by the Defense Institute of International Legal Studies. The counterterrorism and counterdrug courses were all attended by the military with no police or other civilian involvement. It should be noted however, that the majority of the counterdrug courses were for the Paraguayan Air Force which

supports counterdrug operations with their Helicopter Group. There were also PME courses. The training attended shows a very narrow focus on an internal role with only a few peacekeeping courses and no courses with a civil-military relations theme. A Civil-Military Relations MET such as the ones conducted in Argentina, El Salvador, and Honduras might be of benefit here as well as providing more encouragement for police to attend counterterrorism or counterdrug courses.

In Honduras, the training for 2010-2011 reflects consideration for the coup that occurred in 2009 with a heavy focus on civil-military relations—attended by both civilians and military—and no dual use courses. When one looks at the training that occurred prior to the coup going back to 2007, there is a marked difference with several dual use infantry courses and all other counterdrug and counterterrorism courses being attended by military members. Counterdrug courses included CNT Information Analyst, Counterdrug Operations, and Counterdrug Intelligence Officer. Perhaps after the experience of the coup there will continue to be a focus on improving civil-military relations and a move away from dual use courses. There should also be more encouragement for the police to attend counterterrorism and counterdrug training rather than the military once those courses are offered again to Honduras.

## **Conclusion**

It would be naïve to propose that the United States should immediately stop providing support in areas where the military are used in internal roles. This would only plunge Latin American countries deeper into problems with the security threats they already face along with increasing the threat to the United States. It would be irresponsible at this point to do such a thing but there should be a road ahead to eventually transition the military away from these



internal roles in Latin America. There are ways that the DOD can assist on this road ahead and continue to provide assistance during and after such a transition.

## **Recommendations**

One of the first steps to a transition away from the military being used in an internal security role and towards the police providing internal order and security should entail a US interagency approach to work with each country to define a plan and timeline for such a transition to occur. Some may argue that there is already an interagency approach but this paper argues for a longer-term plan rather than the reaction to immediate threats that is occurring now. Part of the individual country transition plans should also be for the DOD to look closer at dual use training. This issue should be examined to determine how much longer that training should continue depending on the transition timeline and what external missions the military might use that training for.

The transition plan should also entail development of the police and other institutions rather than just equipping and training (which also need to be done). A model could be the original version of the US Justice Department's International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP). The ICITAP had worked in the areas of police development such as the creation of national police forces in El Salvador and Panama through sustainable practices.<sup>51</sup> This would provide a broader strategy for developing the police into a force that is capable of dealing with threats over the long-term. This is extremely important because according to *AmericasBarometer*, "Developing national trust in the police is key to nation building and, as well, critical to democratic stability...[citizens] are also more likely to feel that government is doing an effective job because the police force is one of the most public arms of the government."<sup>52</sup>

The question might be asked about funding sources since the Department of Justice (DOJ) and DOS claim that they do not have the funding to carry this out. Yet certain DOD funds can be used by the DOS such as 1207 funding. This is a temporary way of providing funds to DOS until they are adequately resourced. Note that “Under authority stated in Section 1207 of the National Defense Authorization Act...Congress provided the State Department a mechanism to receive DOD funds for ‘reconstruction, security, or stabilization assistance to a foreign country.’...DOD is also requesting that the transfer authority be extended to other U.S. agencies besides the State Department.”<sup>53</sup>

If the DOD were able to get this transfer authority extended, it could be used to provide funding to the DOJ as well. Perhaps this could also involve counterdrug funding such as Section 1004 funding, which is for counterdrug training, and Section 1033 funding, which is for counterdrug operations equipment. If a portion of these funds, that are currently being used to train and equip the military, were transferred to the DOJ, this would provide the DOJ with more funding to develop the police in a way that could be sustained. Another option is to restrict this funding to only be used for training and equipping military units that perform an aerial or maritime interdiction role and police. Another option, Section 1206 funding, is a controversial area via which the DOD can train and equip foreign police for the purpose of counter-terrorism operations.<sup>54</sup> A portion of this could also be transferred to the DOJ and DOS so that training could be done by civilian agencies instead of by the military. Of course, every agency has a vested interest in their budget and the DOD is no different. It is difficult for any agency to discuss transferring some of their funding to another agency but in this case, it may be more appropriate and desirable for US security objectives.

General Fraser's recent Posture Statement emphasizes regional cooperation and mentions Colombia as one of the countries that is providing training: "Colombia is providing training to military personnel in its Regional Training Center and to over 2,000 police officers in Central America."<sup>55</sup> By working with police and military from other countries in the region, the countries that receive the training can look at other Latin American models that may work better for them than the US model. For example, the US police force is composed of the FBI at the national level, state police and local police. Many Latin American countries do not use this as a model; they have only national police.

Chile, Argentina, and Brazil are other countries that can provide training for police. In Chile and Argentina, "the gap between the police and military is filled by hybrid security forces uniquely qualified to take on intermediate threats, having both internal security and national defense missions."<sup>56</sup> Chile's *Carabineros* and Argentina's *Gendarmeria* are respected and trusted and they use "skilled social communication...and restraint" in conducting their mission."<sup>57</sup> The police in Brazil have been making inroads with the *favelas*, or shantytowns, in Rio de Janeiro and by "integrating themselves into the communities, the specially trained police established permanent control of the city's most dangerous neighborhoods."<sup>58</sup> It will be important to integrate these countries into each country's development plan for the police.

The National Guard's State Partnership Program (SPP) is an avenue that can be used throughout and after the transition process to conduct engagements with the military and civilians. Through SPP, a state in the United States is partnered with a country and they can conduct exchanges in order to support security cooperation objectives. This program provides a way to build lasting relationships since the same people can be involved over a longer timeframe which cannot be accomplished by active duty military that continually move on to other

positions. It also provides a way for smaller countries to be able to identify a little more easily with the scope that a state can provide rather than the sometimes overwhelming size of the active duty military or federal government of the United States. It offers a unique opportunity for countries to interact with individual US state governments and agencies, such as state emergency management agencies or civic organizations.

Unfortunately, the guidelines for the program have become more stringent which does not allow for many activities with the civilian sector. According to an officer working in SPP, “SPP was initially a congressionally funded program that did not fall under the DOD or the purview of the DOD. With that, SPP had some latitude on how funds were spent. We could pay for civ-to-civ activities. With that latitude we were able to better support the civilian agencies.”<sup>59</sup> This changed once SPP fell under DOD purview. Now exchanges can still be done with civilians but travel for civilians cannot be funded. This makes conducting civilian-to-civilian exchanges more difficult. This paper proposes a return to the guidelines that allowed funding for the civilian portion of the program so that the DOD can further support the development of civilian agencies in Latin American countries in an effort to transition activities to them. The SPP made valuable contributions in the area of civ-to-civ activities in the past that can help strengthen civilian agencies in the future.

Finally, the DOD should continue to work with militaries in the area of external defense to reinforce that key role. The SOUTHCOM Command Strategy already emphasizes the importance of this, in that “Regional militaries have made great strides in recent decades regarding professionalization, respect for human rights and subordination to civil authority. They have generally embraced new roles such as humanitarian relief and Peacekeeping Operations (PKO). We should encourage all these trends.” Once internal security has been fully

transitioned back to civilian authorities, it will be important to alleviate military concerns about justification for their existence and help provide avenues for them to be seen as a useful and respected force in their countries--all of which contributes to healthy civil-military relations.

## **Conclusions**

Latin America is facing many internal threats today and there is a temptation by some countries to use their militaries to face these threats. Many militaries in Latin America are struggling to justify their existence and may see taking on internal security roles as a way to do this. The United States is impacted by the same transnational threats and is assisting Latin American partners with combatting them. Although it may seem as if the United States is not directly training and equipping the militaries in Latin America to take on a police role, there are dual use courses and certain types of funding that support this even though it may be indirectly. Training programs need to be looked at very carefully to avoid this concern.

On the other hand, the United States could not simply stop providing this training and equipment for the military because it would severely impact the ability of countries in Latin America to combat the threats they currently face. The best course of action is for the United States to plan for the long-term and be aware of the impact that certain training may have. There should be a long-term plan to develop police forces and civilian agencies rather than just reacting to threats in the short-term. There should also be dialogue with certain Latin American countries to discuss a timeline for a transition to the police and civilian agencies and for the militaries to return to focusing on external defense. In order to accomplish this, the militaries need to have an external defense mission to go back to and, since the chances of actions against their neighbors are low, this means assisting these militaries with building up peacekeeping units or preparing them for multinational operations abroad.

The United States cannot do this alone; a fact which has already been recognized. Regional partners should be included since they may provide better models than the United States. The United States has a long history of democracy and good civil-military relations but it cannot make the mistake of trying to mirror image and expect countries in Latin America to follow its model exactly. There may need to be a mix between what has been successful for the United States and what has been successful for certain countries in the region. In the case of civil-military relations, the countries that have their militaries focused on an external defense role seem to have had the most success in improving civil-military relations. Strengthening the capabilities of civilian agencies in Central and South America will not only allow them to meet the internal security threats—which also benefits the United States—but also helps move the military away from an internal role. The United States should help militaries in Latin America move in this direction in a responsible manner and away from internal security roles in order to strengthen democratic civil-military relations.

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